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What We Don't Teach in Trial
Advocacy: A Proposed Course in
Trial Law
J. Alexander Tanford
For several years I have been teaching a course called Trial Law and
Procedure. This is not a simulation course in trial advocacy. It is a
traditional classroom offering in which students read and discuss a collec-
tion of cases, materials, and problems that focus on the jurisprudence,
principles, and doctrines of trials.1 To my knowledge, no other law school
regularly offers a basic trial law course.2 This is a curious deficiency, given
the centrality of the trial to our conception of the legal universe. In this
article, I will explain why I think a trial law and procedure course would be
a useful addition to the crowded curriculum.
I. Why Teach Trial Law?
Just because one could put together a set of cases and materials on trial
law does not necessarily mean it is useful to teach such a course. We do not
teach every conceivable legal subject.3 We assume (somewhat optimistically)
that our graduates will have the basic research skills to go to the library and
find their own cases and materials. We also assume (even more optimisti-
cally) that they will have learned to think critically enough about law and
legal institutions that they can teach themselves subjects not covered in law
school, such as the law of salmon farming.4 I think there are, however, two
J. Alexander Tanford is Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana
University at Bloomington School of Law. Pat Baude, Craig Bradley, Dan Conkle, and Ed
Greenebaum kindly read and criticized an earlier draft of this article. The title was stolen from
Steve Lubet's What We Should Teach (But Don't) When We Teach Trial Advocacy, 37J. Legal
Educ. 123 (1987).
1. J. Alexander Tanford, Trial Law and Procedure: Readings, Cases, Problems and Other
Materials (1991 mimeo) (approx. 500 pp.). Copies are available by writing to the author
at Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, IN 47405.
2. A few similar courses may exist of which I am unaware. Cf. Kenney Hegland, Moral
Dilemmas in Teaching Trial Advocacy, 32 J. Legal Educ. 69, 69 (1982) (skills courses
spend little time grappling with jurisprudential theory).
3. Animal law comes to mind. See Erik M. Jensen, A Call for a New Buffalo Law
Scholarship, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 433, 434 (1990) (lamenting absence of scholarly
attention to the legal status of both new and old buffaloes). Although animal law is the
subject of treatises, e.g., David S. Favre & Murray Loring, Animal Law (Westport,
Conn., 1983) and a periodical (Animal Law Report), I am not aware of any courses being
taught on it.
4. See William Howarth, The Legal Status of Fish Farming, 1987J. Plan. & Envtl. L. 484;
Michael C. Blumm, Why Study Pacific Salmon Law, 22 Idaho L. Rev. 629 (1986). The
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sound pedagogical reasons for teaching trial law: The course contributes
something meaningful to the core education of law students, and there are
educational costs associated with not teaching it.
A. Trial Law Contributes Something Educationally Meaningful
The litigation paradigm dominates legal discourse. The idea that dis-
putes will be resolved in courtrooms (or in anticipation of going to trial)
pervades the structure of much of the law, especially the subjects taught in
the first year of law school. Our litigation focus also is apparent in our
choice of the appellate case teaching method. A trial law course can provide
an opportunity for students to develop their critical thinking about funda-
mental aspects of the trial system, such as the relative merits of the
adversarial structure of the trial, its truth-determining capabilities, effi-
ciency, and social role. 5
The constitution includes a number of provisions that address trial
procedure. Some may have been discussed briefly in other courses: the
right to a jury trial in civil6 and criminal cases7; jury size, unanimity, and
composition8 ; the right of confrontation and compulsory process9 ; and
prosecutorial comment on the defendant's decision not to testify.' 0 In Trial
Law, relevant Supreme Court cases can be placed in their trial context. For
example, Batson v. Kentucky may have been discussed in Constitutional Law
as a logical extension of constitutional doctrine promoting racial equality.
In Trial Law, the Batson decision can be discussed at a more complex level,
focusing not only on whether race-based peremptory challenges are
consistent with equal protection doctrine but also on whether they are
consistent with surrounding rules of jury selection, the adversary balance,
principles of attorney tactical latitude, and the psychology of juror behav-
ior.
examples are drawn from Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit
of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926, 930 (1990).
5. The pros and cons of the adversary system are mentioned only briefly if at all in other
coursebooks. In Criminal Procedure, for example, Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave &
Jerold H. Israel, Modem Criminal Procedure 1358-64, 7th ed. (St. Paul, Minn., 1990)
include only four pages of relevant materials; James Haddad, James Zagel, Gary
Starkman & William Bauer, Criminal Procedure, 3d ed. (Mineola, N.Y., 1987) do not
mention it at all. In Evidence, Edward W. Cleary, John William Strong, Kenneth S.
Broun & Robert P. Mosteller, Evidence 48-80, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn., 1988) include
materials on it, while Eric D. Green & Charles R. Nesson, Evidence (Boston, 1983) do
not. In Civil Procedure, David W. Louisell, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., & Colin C. Tait,
Cases and Materials on Pleading and Procedure 29-51, 6th ed. (Mineola, N.Y., 1989)
discuss it, but Jonathan M. Landers, James A. Martin & Stephen C. Yeazell, Civil
Procedure, 2d ed. (Boston, 1988) do not.
6. See, e.g., John J. Cound, Jack H. Friedenthal, Arthur R. Miller & John E. Sexton, Civil
Procedure 876-913, 5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn., 1989); Louisell, Hazard & Tait, supra note
5, at 1001-62; Landers, Martin & Yeazell, supra note 5, at 703-35.
7. E.g., Kamisar, LaFave & Israel, supra note 5, at 1288-91; Haddad, Zagel, Starkman &
Bauer, supra note 5, at 1080-89.
8. See, e.g., Kamisar, LaFave & Israel, supra note 5, at 1291-94, 1299-05, 1310-28;
Haddad, Zagel, Starkman & Bauer, supra note 5, at 1089-1126.
9. E.g., Cleary, Strong, Broun & Mosteller, supra note 5, at 716-42; Green & Nesson, supra
note 5, at 495-517; Richard 0. Lempert & Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach
to Evidence 551-609, 2d ed. (St. Paul, Minn., 1982).
10. Kamisar, LaFave & Israel, supra note 5, at 1384-89; Haddad, Zagel, Starkman & Bauer,
supra note 5, at 1270-75.
Teaching Trial Law
Trial Law cases can also provide new insights on familiar jurisprudential
themes that cut across the curriculum. One good example is the debate over
the role of original intent and precedent in constitutional adjudication. The
debate is often cast in terms that equate judicial activism with justices on the
political left. In decisions concerning juries of fewer than twelve persons,
however, the sides have been reversed. In Williams v. Florida," it is the
conservative justices who ignore the framers' intent 2 and clear precedent' 3
and argue that constitutional interpretation has to take contemporary social
needs (in this case, efficiency) into account. 14
Of course, trial law also introduces a host of new legal issues, principles
and rules unlikely to have been mentioned in other courses. Some have
constitutional dimensions, such as inadvertent waiver of the right to ajury;
the meaning of the phrase "shall be preserved" in the Seventh Amend-
ment; the "material and favorable" test for triggering compulsory-process
clause protection; the distinction between impartial jurors and an impartial
jury; whether the right to counsel means the right to present a strategically
advantageous defense; whether defense evidence may be excluded as a
penalty for violations of rules of trial procedure; the right to argue; the
effect of prosecutorial arguments that the jury should ignore constitutional
standards (jury nullification arguments); and whether the due-process
clause gives civil litigants any right to present evidence, cross-examine
witnesses, or make arguments. An even broader array of trial law issues are
matters of state law.' 5
Finally, trial law presents a rare opportunity for direct comparison
between civil and criminal cases. Trials are a common element of civil and
criminal procedure. Therefore, they are a good vehicle for facilitating
discussion about similarities and differences between civil and criminal
systems' 6 in a curriculum that otherwise treats them separately.' 7
B. The Incompleteness of the Curent Approach to Trial Practice
The existing trial practice curriculum generally consists of a single
simulation course called Trial Advocacy, which focuses on trial skills and
tactics. Mauet's leading textbook summarizes its agenda as follows:
11. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
12. Id. at 98-99, 103.
13. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) (accused cannot be deprived of right to
twelve-person jury).
14. 399 U.S. at 99-103; id. at 137 (Harlan, J., concurring).
15. See J. Alexander Tanford, An Introduction to Trial Law, 51 Mo. L. Rev. 623, 626-28
(1986).
16. Compare, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (juries of fewer than twelve in
criminal cases) with Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (juries of fewer than 12 in
civil cases); orcompare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth-amendment right
to jury trial incorporated in fourteenth amendment and applies to states) with Beacon
Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1964) (seventh-amendment right to jury trials is not
incorporated, does not apply to states).
17. But see Robert M. Cover, Owen M. Fiss & Judith Resnik, Procedure (Westbury, N.Y.,
1988) (valiant effort to combine civil, criminal, and administrative procedure into one
mega-procedure course).
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[T]he effective trial lawyers always seem to have two complementary abilities.
First, they have developed a methodology that thoroughly analyzes and prepares
each case for trial. Second, they have acquired the technical skills necessary to
present their side of a case persuasively in court. It is the synthesis of both
qualities-preparation and execution-that produces effective trial advocacy.' s
Other trial practice texts share this skills-and-tactics agenda. Marilyn
Berger, John Mitchell, and Ronald Clark state that their "sole goal is to
present [the student] with a systematic way of acquiring a set of professional
skills."19 Joseph Howe and Walker Blakey "focus [their] course . . . on
trial tactics and techniques." 20 James Jeans21 and Robert Keeton 22 add some
discussion of trial ethics. Ronald Carlson and Edward Imwinkelried include
psychology.23
None of these books discusses law or the role of the adversary trial
system in society.24 For example, Mauet does not discuss or allude to trial
law except for occasional vague warnings that some judges might not allow
certain tactics. 25 Only occasionally does he even suggest that a judge might
make a decision because a statute or appellate case limits the judge's
discretion rather than because it is the judge's personal rule. Even then the
importance of the law is downplayed: "How jury panels are examined and
selected is controlled by statute, court rules, local practices, and the judge's
preferences. Your first step must always be to determine how a jury is
selected in your judge's courtroom. When in doubt, ask the judge or his
court personnel. '26 I would have thought the first step for an attorney in
doubt about proper procedure would be to research the law.
I do not mean to suggest that we stop teaching Trial Advocacy. Rather,
an agenda that focuses exclusively on skills and tactics is pedagogically
unwise. It gives students an incomplete picture of what they need to know
about trials. Trial skills courses rarely present opportunities for students to
think critically about the adversary trial system as an institution. Students
from the beginning are asked to operate within the principles and assump-
tions of the existing system rather than question them. In some cases,
18. Thomas A. Mauet, Fundamentals of Trial Techniques at xix, 2d ed. (Boston, 1988).
Astute readers will undoubtedly notice that I do not cite my own book, The Trial Process:
Law, Tactics and Ethics, as the leading text. I am proud of my book, but I am not naive.
Even my own students surreptitiously carry copies of Mauet in their backpacks.
19. Marilyn J. Berger, John J. Mitchell & Ronald H. Clark, Trial Advocacy: Planning,
Analysis, and Strategy 1 (Boston, 1989).
20. Joseph D. Howe & WalkerJ. Blakey, Assignments in Trial Practice at v, 5th ed. (Boston,
1986).
21. James W.Jeans, Trial Advocacy at iii (St. Paul, Minn., 1975) (students must learn tactics
and ethics).
22. Robert E. Keeton, Trial Tactics and Methods at ix-xi, 2d ed. (Boston, 1973) (trial
practice is matter of learning tactics and methods, with tangential reference to ethics).
23. Ronald L. Carlson & Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dynamics of Trial Practice 6-8 (St.
Paul, Minn., 1989) (students study psychology, mastery of facts, and strategic and
tactical planning).
24. But see J. Alexander Tanford, The Trial Process: Law, Tactics and Ethics at vii
(Charlottesville, 1983) (criticizing existing trial advocacy texts for ignoring trial law).
25. E.g., Mauet, supra note 18, at 47 (on opening statements, 'judges differ widely in their
interpretation of what constitutes impermissible argument .... The only solution is
to learn what your particular judge's attitude is.").
26. Id. at 26. See also Paul Bergman, Trial Advocacy 288, 2d ed. (St. Paul, Minn., 1989) (one
trial judge's proper opening statement may be another's improper argument; no
suggestion that the issue might have been addressed by appellate courts).
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students may hear the message that obedience to tradition is preferable to
critical thinking.2 7 This is somewhat antithetical to the law school's general
intellectual mission.
Offering a trial advocacy course without also including a trial law course
in the curriculum may cause students to misconceive the legal universe. No
matter how much we deny it, our curriculum implicitly promises to cover,
at least superficially, all the basic information about law that our students
will need to begin practicing it. Therefore, if trial law were important (or
existed at all), surely it would be taught. By offering Trial Advocacy but not
Trial Law, we create the erroneous impression that trial practice somehow
does not involve a significant body of law of its own (other than evidence)
and that trials are regulated solely by judicial discretion and attorney
tactical decisions. I fear that this lawless image may aggravate students'
tendencies to equate trials with the Old West and envision themselves as
gunslingers.
Further, we may be giving students tactical advice that misleads them
about what they will be allowed to do in a courtroom. When we recommend
a trial tactic or tell students it is practiced by experienced litigators, we
implicitly assert that such a tactic is consistent with the rules of trial law. To
the extent that this is not the case, we are misleading our students. The
following examples, drawn from several trial practice texts, demonstrate
the potential danger.
In voir dire, students may be told that "[a]ll commentators agree that you
should always save at least one peremptory challenge-you never know
who will be the last person called to the box."'2 8 This may be good tactical
advice for picking the jury, but it could have unanticipated legal conse-
quences. The procedural default doctrine requires an attorney to exhaust
all peremptory challenges in order to appeal an erroneous ruling on a
challenge for cause.2 9 An attorney who has saved her final peremptory
challenge for tactical reasons may find 'hat she has waived the right to
pursue an otherwise meritorious appeal.
When they study opening statements, students may be advised that they
usually should give one, although "[t]he right to make an opening
statement is a right you can waive."30 This misinforms students. Opening
27. The most famous example is Irving Younger, The Ten Commandments'of Cross-Examination
(videotape), in which Younger yells, "Never, never, never ask anything other than a
leading question" during cross-examination. See also Joseph Kelner & Francis E.
McGovern, Successful Litigation Techniques: Student Edition § 1.03 (New York, 1981)
(students must learn to use techniques "that have proven successful to other litigators").
28. Kenney F. Hegland, Trial and Practice Skills 97 (St. Paul, Minn., 1978). See also Mauet,
supra note 18, at 27: "[N]ever run out of challenges. . . . Always save at least one
peremptory challenge. The cases are legion in which one lawyer used all his challenges
before the complete jury was picked only to discover that the last juror seated was
disastrous for him. Save your last challenge for such an emergency."
29. E.g., Hopkins v. State, 429 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 1981); Williams v. State, 146 Ga. App.
543, 544, 246 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1978); Lambert v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 277 Or.
223, 229, 560 P.2d 262, 265 (1977). See Tanford, supra note 15, at 637.
30. Mauet, supra note 18, at 51.
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statements are waivable only in some jurisdictions.3 1 In others, an opening
statement by the plaintiff is mandatory: plaintiff must describe a prima
facie case or the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict.3 2 Students also
may be advised to disclose weaknesses during opening statements: "Often
a difficult decision in opening statements is whether . . . to volunteer
weaknesses. This involves determining your weaknesses and predicting
whether your opponent intends to use them at trial. . . . [If the weakness
is] known to the opponent, you should volunteer it as soon as possible. '33
Following this advice can have unanticipated legal consequences. Factual
concessions made in opening statement may constitute binding judicial
admissions that not only relieve the opponent of proving the fact but may
even preclude the party making the concession from contesting the facts
admitted.3 4
For cross-examination, students will undoubtedly hear the conventional
wisdom that they should try to control witnesses and prevent evasion and
explanation: "The explaining or arguing witness presents [a problem on]
cross-examination . . . . This witness wants to expound on every-
thing. . . . The key to such a witness is control. When the witness-
. . . keeps on talking, cut him off by asking your next question. '35
Although the attorney may be able to prevent a witness from giving
unresponsive answers or volunteering information that was not
requested,36 most courts have held that the attorney has no right to prevent
a witness from giving a responsive explanation. To the contrary, the rule in
almost all states is that the witnesses are permitted to explain their answers,
even to questions that called for only a yes or no answer.3 7
When they read about closing arguments, students may see the assertion
that "[t]he plaintiff always has the right to open and close the arguments." 38
However, in several states, the parties are entitled to only one argument
each.39 In others, the defendant can earn the right to argue first and last by
31. E.g., Winter v. Unaitis, 189 A.2d 547 (Vt. 1983) (no statute or case law in Vermont
requires an opening).
32. E.g., Fleetwood v. State, 168 Ind. App. 545, 549, 343 N.E.2d 812, 814 (1976) (opening
mandatory); Slade v. City of Phoenix, 112 Ariz. 289, 299, 541 P.2d 550, 551 (1975)
(defendant entitled to directed verdict if plaintiff's opening inadequate); State v.
Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 632, 257 So.2d 121, 130 (1971) (opening mandatory); White v.
State, 11 Md. App. 423, 428, 274 A.2d 671, 674 (1971) (defendant entitled to directed
verdict). See Tanford, Trial Law, supra note 15, at 647.
33. Mauet, supra note 18, at 50. See also Bergman, supra note 26, at 296 (advising students
to disclose weaknesses).
34. E.g., Lystarczyk v. Smits, 435 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (must be "clear
and unequivocal" admission of fact); Miller v. Johnston, 270 Cal. App. 2d 289, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 699, 705 (1969). See Tanford, supra note 15, at 648.
35. Mauet, supra note 18, at 261. Cf. Bergman, supra note 26, at 215-17 (somejudges permit
explanations).
36. E.g., Mullins v. State, 157 Ga. App. 204, 206, 276, S.E.2d 877, 879 (1981).
37. E.g., State v. Marshall, 571 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Rouse, 256 La.
275,287,236 So.2d 211,215 (1970); Bankv. Egan, 240 Minn. 192,200,60 N.W.2d 257,
262 (1953). See Tanford, supra note 15, at 668-69.
38. Kelner & McGovern, supra note 27, at § 17.01; Mauet, supra note 18, at 278.
39. E.g., Ky. R. Civ. P. 43.02(e) (1990) (defendant first, plaintiff concludes); Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.03(11)(h-i) (1979) (prosecution first, defendant concludes). See J. Alexander
Tanford, Closing Argument Procedure, 10 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 47, 76-77 (1986).
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presenting no evidence in its case-in-chief 40 or by conceding a prima facie
case and proceeding solely on an affirmative defense.41
For the content of argument, students may encounter the following
example of a damages argument:
In a land of normal people, what is it worth to be able to walk, stand, and lead a
normal active life like everyone else? May I suggest the sum of $40,000 as a fair
figure? . . . If [opposing] counsel thinks $40,000 is too high . . . , let the
defense tell you why it is too large.
42
Students might be led to believe that attorneys may tell the jury their
personal opinions as to what constitutes a fair damage award. This is
inconsistent with case law that holds that specific suggestions about damage
amounts must be derived from evidence and common experience 43 and
that attorneys are not permitted to state their personal opinions.44
The net result of the dominant skills-and-tactics approach may be that
we inadvertently teach students bad law while erecting roadblocks to their
ability to recognize it as such. I believe, therefore, that we should supple-
ment Trial Advocacy with a course in Trial Law.
II. Course Description
My Trial Law course covers five aspects of trials: their historical context
and development, contemporary theoretical debates about what trials
should be, the conflicting jurisprudential principles that shape trials,
relevant Supreme Court opinions, and the complex body of doctrine that
purports to regulate trials.
In the first part of the course, I provide students with an overview of the
long history of trials. I use Wigmore's marvelous description of ordeals,
compurgations, and other early forms of dispute resolution, 45 and excerpts
from Landsman's history of trials in the United States.46 Alternative choices
of readings abound that are more detailed or that more explicitly address
the earlier political context in which trial law developed.
After the historical introduction, students read selections from the
substantial body of literature on the theory of trials. The centerpiece is the
classic debate between Lon Fuller and Jerome Frank over the relative
40. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 17-8-71 (1990).
41. E.g., Silver v. New York Life Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 59, 61 (7th Cir. 1940) (defendant earned
right to open and close by substantially admitting all major allegations). See Tanford,
supra note 39, at 77-80.
42. Mauet, supra note 18, at 293-95.
43. E.g., Levin v. Ritson, 179 Conn. 223, 226-27, 425 A.2d 1279, 1281 (1979); Graeff v.
Baptist Temple of Springfield, 576 S.W.2d 291, 321 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (fair and
reasonable standards; attorney cannot state personal opinion about damages).
44. E.g., Boyd v. State, 643 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). See Tanford, supra note 15,
at 690, 692. See also Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(4) (1980)
(improper for attorney to express personal opinion on merits of case).
45. John Henry Wigmore, A Kaleidoscope of Justice 5-42 (Washington, D.C., 1941).
46. Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44
Ohio St. L.J. 713, 720-36 (1983).
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merits of adversariness and truth seeking.47 The debate has remained lively
and continues to generate heated discussion. 48 Other readings examine
trials from more contemporary theoretical perspectives: economic
efficiency, 49 communitarianism (both conservative 50 and progressive5' for-
mulations), law as political ideology, 52 and the role of trial courts in
society. 53
The third part of the course uses trials as vehicles for discussing several
catholic jurisprudential issues. Prominent among these are the myth of
judicial neutrality54 and the concomitant problem of the politically influ-
enced exercise of discretion, 55 the appropriate role of social science in
formulating legal policy,56 and the problem of racism and sexism in the
legal system. 57
Other familiar jurisprudential and policy issues arise throughout the
course. Cases such as Williams v. Florida5 s on six-person juries and Johnson
47. Compare Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958) with Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth
and Reality in American Justice 80-102 (Princeton, 1949).
48. See, e.g., Note, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for Judicial Interven-
tion, 65 Ind. L.J. 445 (1990); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or
Phoenix, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1984). Compare Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth:
An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031, 1032-41 (1975) with H. Richard Uviller,
The Advocate, the Truth, andJudicial Hackles: A Reaction to judge Frankel's Idea, 123
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1067 (1975); Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth,
123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1060 (1975).
49. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient
Litigation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 734 (1987); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4 (1983).
50. See, e.g., Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological
Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C.L. Rev. 481,498-502, 513-14 (1987).
51. J. Alexander Tanford, Racism in the Adversary System: The Defendant's Use of
Peremptory Challenges, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1015, 1055-57 (1990).
52. See, e.g., Mirjan Damiska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Proce-
dure, 84 Yale L.J. 480 (1975); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural
Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev 29.
53. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren
and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 197-202 (1983); C. K.
Rowland, Donald Songer & Robert A. Carp, Presidential Effects on Criminal Justice
Policy in the Lower Federal Courts: The Reagan Judges, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 191(1988); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Women in the Courts Today: How Much Has Changed,
6 Law & Ineq. 27 (1988).
54. E.g., Marvin Frankel, Partisan Justice 39-51 (New York, 1980). See also United States v.
Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 385-91 (7th Cir. 1972) (trial of "Chicago Seven" antiwar
protestors).
55. See, e.g., George C. Christie, An Essay in Discretion 1986 Duke L.J. 747, 747; Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31-39 (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).
56. See, e.g., J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme
Court and Psychology, 66 Ind. L.J. 137, 144-50 (1990). See also Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162, 202 (1986) (empirical data showing that death-qualification produces
biased jury); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (empirical data showing smallerjuries produces less reliable verdicts).
57. See, e.g., Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 Fordham
Urban L.J. 11, 113-26 (1986-87) (experiences of women litigants); id. at 126-46
(women attorneys in court); id. at 154-61 (women court employees); Tanford, supra
note 51 (racially motivated jury selection).
58. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
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v. Louisiana59 on nonunanimous verdicts provide fertile ground for discuss-
ing the role of precedent and the intent of the framers in constitutional
interpretation. 60 Coy v. Iowa6 l and Booth v. Maryland62 implicate the
appropriate role in the criminal justice system for victims and their families.
Lockhart v. McCree63 contributes to the debate over whether it is possible to
have a fair death penalty. Batson v. Kentucky64 is a natural vehicle for
discussing the role of legal institutions in combatting racism.
The fourth part of the course presents a wealth of Supreme Court cases
announcing the broad principles of trial law. Many opinions involve
interpretation of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments, articulating a basic
conception of a fair trial. These include the scope of the right to a jury
trial6 5 ; jury size 66; the meaning of the right to counsel during trial67; the
meaning of the guarantee of a public trial, including free press/fair trial
issues68 ; and the various meanings of the impartial jury requirement.69
Other constitutional issues are deferred until the final section of the
course, when they can be considered in the context of the common-law
doctrine of trials. For example, the scope of the right to compulsory
process70 and confrontation 7' in criminal trials is included in the discussion
of direct and cross-examination so that a criminal defendant's rights can be
compared with the ability of other litigants to participate in witness
examination. Batson v. Kentucky's prohibition against exercising peremptory
challenges against African-Americans to create all-white juries72 is dis-
cussed in the context of jury selection as a whole.
The fifth part of the course introduces students to the doctrinal
principles and rules that regulate all aspects of trials from jury selection to
deliberations. 73 The material is extensive and comes from a wide variety of
59. 406 U.S. 356, 364 (1972).
60. Compare, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 344 (1898) (jury referred to in
constitution is twelve persons, neither more nor less) with Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 99 (1970) (there is absolutely no indication that framers meant a jury to comprise
twelve persons).
61. 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (protecting child-abuse victims at the expense of a
defendant's right to confrontation).
62. 482 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1987) (whether jury should consider statements about effect of
crime on victim's family). See also South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810 (1989)
(whether jury's decision to convict and sentence should be based in part on the victim's
personal characteristics).
63. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
64. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See People v. Kern, 545 N.Y.S.2d 4 (App. Div. 1989) (Howard Beach
trial). See also Tanford, supra note 51, at 1017 (extension of Batson to defense attorneys).
65. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (criminal cases); Beacon Theaters v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1960) (civil cases).
66. E.g, Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
67. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).
68. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
69. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (fair cross-section requirement);
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 530 (1973) (impartiality requirement).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 866 (1982).
71. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974).
72. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
73. See Tanford, supra note 15 (synthesizing trial law doctrines and principles).
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legal sources: state constitutions, 74 statutes,75 case law,76 and court rules.77
This body of law contains all the necessary elements for a challenging
learning experience: illogical rules78 and bad Supreme Court decisions to
criticize, 79 fundamental conflicts between jurisdictions to resolve,80 cases
with well-reasoned opinions and dissents to ponder,81 and unresolvable
dilemmas in public policy to debate.8 2 Studying this stuff might even
improve a student's ability to competently try cases.
III. Conclusion
Teaching Trial Advocacy apart from its legal context transforms lawyers'
litigation decisions into purely tactical ones. This oversimplification de-
prives students of an opportunity to think critically about one of the central
institutions in our legal system; the narrow focus misleads them about the
existence and importance of trial law. In practice, if lawyers make decisions
without understanding relevant legal limitations, they are courting
disaster.8 3 I think we have an obligation to do a more complete job of
teaching about trials than we now do.
I do not think we can solve the problem by just adding a trial law
component to existing advocacy courses. I tried that in The Trial Process:
Law, Tactics and Ethics, and trial advocacy teachers have been staying away
from the book in droves. Learning basic trial skills and tactics is time
consuming enough without adding extensive materials on trial law.84 Even
74. E.g., Conn. Const., art. I, § 19 (party's right to question eachjuror personally during voir
dire shall be inviolate).
75. E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1212 (1990) (statutory grounds for challenges for cause).
76. E.g., State v. Thomas, 307 Minn. 229, 230, 239 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1976) (propriety of
explaining burden of proof in language that deviates from jury instruction).
77. E.g., Mich. Gen. Ct. R. 507 (1963) (covering procedure for opening statements, order of
presentation, and right to make a closing argument).
78. E.g., United States v. Hooper, 575 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1978) (jurors may not see a
written copy of their jury instructions). See Amiram Elwork, Bruce D. Sales & James J.
Alfini, MakingJury Instructions Understandable 18-20 (Charlottesville, 1982) (research
on educational and cognitive psychology shows that written instructions are more easily
understood than oral instructions).
79. Take your pick. My favorite is Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987)
(conviction affirmed despite fact that jurors used cocaine and drank liquor during the
trial).
80. Compare Slade v. City of Phoenix, 121 Ariz. 298, 299, 541 P.2d 550, 551 (1975) (judge
may grant directed verdict based on opening statement) with Goff v. Richards, 19 Md.
App. 250, 252, 310 A.2d 203, 204 (1973) (judge may not grant directed verdict based
solely on opening statements).
81. E.g., Roman v. Mitchell, 413 A.2d 322, 328 (1980) (propriety of voir dire questions
concerning insurance coverage).
82. E.g., McDonough Power Equip. Co. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 555 (1984) (what
happens when a juror is dishonest during voir dire, hiding information that would
probably have led a party to remove him peremptorily).
83. See the movie Body Heat, starring Kathleen Turner and William Hurt, in which a lawyer
tries to draft a will without understanding the rule against perpetuities, which leads to
sex, murder, and a prison term. As to the propriety of citing movies, see Jensen, supra
note 3, at 433 n.2 (citing famous airport scene in Casablanca); Robert Laurence, Last
Night While You Prepared for Class I Went to See Light of Day, 39 J. Legal Educ. 87
(1989).
84. See Steven Lubet, What We Should Teach (But Don't) When We Teach Trial Advocacy,
37 J. Legal Educ. 123, 134 (1987) (present trial advocacy agenda is already crowded).
Teaching Trial Law
if we were to include some rudimentary information on trial law along with
skills and tactics, I am not sure we could find the time to reflect on the
jurisprudence of the adversary system and to dissect Supreme Court cases
on juries. The conclusion I have reached is that we should offer a new
course on Trial Law and Procedure.8 5
85. A detailed outline of the course and/or a set of readings and problems is available.
Address requests to J. Alexander Tanford, Indiana University School of Law, Bloom-
ington, IN 47405.

